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Structural Referents of “Self” and “Other” in  
Experiential Education as (Un)Democratic Practice
Franklin Vernon
Abstract
This critical ethnography explores a social justice program utilizing nontraditional, democratic, 
“experiential” education practices. The author posits a historical legacy of pedagogy of self obscures 
its emancipatory, democratic potential while simultaneously expanding on contemporary discourses 
of self and other as aspects of the educational setting. Students’ labors to reference and enact oppres-
sive, capitalistic idealizations of either self or other problematizes pragmatic theories of self, and the 
author draws upon critical pragmatism to reposition self and other as aspects of pedagogy and cur-
riculum in democratic education.
In her historical critique of experiential learning theory, Michelson (1999) considered the isolation of self- as- learner paranoid of outside influence— what she 
called the “privatizing of body and mind” (p. 140)— to be the 
primary pitfall of the post- Enlightenment experiential learning 
(EL) movement. Such isolation, wherein learners are encouraged to 
individually and internally construct personally useful knowledge 
from an external, asocial environment such as that promoted 
within learning cycles literature (e.g., Kolb, 1984), is argued to 
hamper democratic participation by adopting isolated, cognitivist 
approaches to learning and growth (Vernon, 2013, 2014). Some 
form of this conversation of the isolated learner and subsequent 
issues with democratic learning has been recurring in experiential 
learning theory for over a decade (e.g., Fenwick, 2001; Miettinen, 
2000; Seaman & Nelsen, 2011; Vernon, 2013), yet surprisingly little 
systematic research has been accomplished that looks into the 
particulars of the potential for educational programming drawing 
on EL theory to set the conditions for an interdependent, demo-
cratic learning environment (see also Rheingold, 2012; Seaman & 
Rheingold, 2013; Vernon, 2014). In this paper, I present data and 
analyses from my own research, adding to this literature. In tandem 
with a decade of scholarly critique, my interactions with 
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experiential educators throughout this research indicated that 
most were largely unaware of theoretical work in EL outside of or 
beyond learning cycles discourses (see also Miettinen, 2000; 
Seaman, 2008), pointing to a need to intersect substantive, 
interactional research on democratic learning with contemporary 
practices among EL communities while maintaining an active 
connection with a literature that does not appear to have become 
practically dated, despite some academic pleas to render it so (e.g., 
Miettinen, 2000; Vernon, 2013).
In this paper I employ a critical, shifting text (Babich, 1994) to 
entwine genres and present my own ethnographic research and 
analyses regarding a contemporary— and on many levels commend-
able, though here I focus on a problematic fixture— educational 
program influenced by EL. From June through August of 2013, I 
joined an American- style Outward Bound school (A- OB) as an 
ethnographer to study both the organization and a unique, experien-
tial education (EE) setting: what I am titling the Diversity Program,  
a cluster of courses partnered with public school systems in one 
particular state aimed at creating a democratic setting of “a learning 
culture within which issues of diversity and social justice can be 
positively addressed” (American Outward Bound [A- OB], n.d.). 
When analyzing data from the study, self and other arose as central 
concepts for addressing the question of democratic education within 
this contemporary example of EE, which draws on EL theory— 
particularly within individual- constructivist traditions (e.g., Kolb, 
1984)— for curricular and pedagogical direction; these concepts of 
self and other will be the primary mode through which I hope to 
unwarp a discussion of (un)democratic learning activity which 
pushes out from discussions of the “isolated self.”
My ethnographic relationship with A- OB and the Diversity 
Program had three distinct stages: First, I quite literally lived in 
the A- OB administrative offices of the school, sleeping on the 
floor at night, where I collected and analyzed documents from 
the library and Diversity Program files and interviewed and 
observed administrative staff; second, I was embedded within a 
co- instructor team for 12 days as an observer and peripheral 
participant while the two co- educators planned, ran, and 
wrapped up a Diversity Course; and third, I traveled to the city 
where the nine Diversity students were from to meet with them 
as well as to interview the staff who oversaw the public school’s 
commitment to the program. Throughout my study, the 
primary question driving my research was: In what manners 
can EL– inspired education, and more specifically outdoor 
adventure– based experiential education (OEE), act as a site for 
education for democracy? My primary interactions with the 
Diversity Program research participants concluded in the 
spring of 2014; this paper reports on data from the summer of 
2013 and focuses specifically on a key aspect of the course 
curriculum and pedagogy that played a central role in their 
interactions, and which raises perspectives germane to dis-
courses of self and critiques of isolation in EL theory: the 
organizationally idealized education of self/other generations 
and interactions among participants.
Outward Bound and Self
The United States’ Outward Bound schools began in 1962 to 
provide outdoor adventure– based, experiential programming to 
the American public, such as school systems, camps, and 
communities, as well as the global public through open- 
enrollment programs (A- OB, n.d.; Miner & Boldt, 2002) within 
the wild areas of the country. The particular A- OB school I 
studied is a charter member of the larger Outward Bound 
International (OBI), which is made up of a collection of Outward 
Bound schools in over forty countries around the world; the 
United States alone is now home to dozens of Outward Bound 
schools offering educational programming to diverse student 
groups in both urban and wilderness settings.
Outward Bound originated in the United Kingdom during 
World War II as the brainchild of businessman Lawrence Holt and 
educator Kurt Hahn (Miner & Boldt, 2002). The earliest schools 
used a mixture of outdoor adventure with “a reasonable element of 
danger” (Hahn, 1949), such as sailing or mountaineering coupled 
with rescue training, to encourage young males toward a holistic 
and nationalistic passion for Christian service (Hahn, 1949, p. 8). 
Hahn’s educational philosophy was a hybridization of Romance- 
inspired Allgemeinbildung (Klafki, 2000; Rohrs, 1966); the 
conservative and sexually repressive pedagogy of British educator 
Cecil Reddie (Darling, 1981; Hahn, 1949); and the aristocratic 
politics of a 19th- century Enlightenment interpretation of Platonic 
philosophy (e.g., Hahn, 1934; see also van Oord, 2010; Worsley, 
1985). It should also be no surprise that Hahn, who was born into 
an aristocratic German family and raised in both British and 
German school systems, should show the influences of both 
educational traditions.
Whilst little discussed in English- speaking academic  
circles, the German educational philosophy of Bildung is ubiqui-
tous throughout central Europe (Westbury, 2000). Lacking a 
direct translation, the concept— of which there are many itera-
tions throughout nearly three centuries of literature— deals with 
the self- origination and growth of an individual- in- culture in 
such a manner as to develop and use one’s intelligence to benefit 
humanity (Klafki, 2000; Lüth, 2000). Whereas Bildung is 
sometimes organized into specific subject matter, Allgemeinbil-
dung can be thought of as a general, or whole- curriculum, 
Bildung, through which individuals work to develop the possi-
bilities of their full human powers in manners that directly 
impact culture and society (Klafki, 2000). Hahn, when translat-
ing his pedagogy for an English audience, used the term grande 
passion (Hahn, 1934, 1949) to articulate this self- originating 
power, and felt that a student’s manifestation of a grande passion 
should mark the development of a curriculum around the child. 
To illustrate, in addresses and speeches he often referenced 
students who, under his care, would discover an innate, grande 
passion for a particular human discipline, such as art or medi-
cine, and the indelible impact on local and national societies 
these students went on to have (e.g., Hahn, 1949, 1960).
Children’s energies through which they could discover and 
commit to a grande passion, in Hahn’s view, were unfortunately 
short- lived and easily corruptible. Situated within the Romantic 
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movement (see also Darling, 1981), Hahn feared that society and 
civilization had a nefarious influence on young boys during 
adolescence. He argued:
Where the public school fails is in the protection of adolescence; 
loyalties draw their vitality from an intact inner strength . . . it can 
survive adolescence, but only on one condition, if on the threshold of 
puberty, healthgiving [sic] passions are stirred. (Hahn, 1949, pp. 4– 5)
That is, Hahn felt that the innate purity of young males’ passions 
were corrupted by sexual development if allowed to occur 
within a sexualized society; removal to an ‘innocent’ setting— 
such as the ocean or mountainside, coupled with physical 
exercise to further delay puberty— would allow for the passion-
ate loyalties necessary for a lifelong Allgemeinbildung to 
crystalize. Left in civilization, Hahn feared young boys would be 
left “at the mercy of impulses that well up during puberty and 
which impatiently and insidiously struggle for satisfaction” 
(Hahn, 1949, p. 5); Outward Bound offered an “island of 
healing” (Hahn, 1949, p. 6), isolating young boys long enough to 
hopefully “[re- ]assemble the dispersed soul of the modern 
young” (Hahn, 1949, p. 8). This cultural organization of self-
hood, what I am describing as the intersubjectively idealized 
symbolic spaces and places an individual is socially referenced 
to and constrained by— whom I will refer to as the inherent 
self— was to be drawn out via a holistic curriculum and bol-
stered by an educational system toward a lifelong movement of 
human completeness. The inherent self can be thought of as one 
of the first iterations within this particular educational lineage.
These retreats to the outdoors as an escape from society and 
sexual development was not new during early 20th century British 
education (or American; see Armstrong, 1990), although his direct 
tie to theories of Bildung made for a unique pedagogy of self. 
Reddie’s tenure as headmaster at the private boarding school 
Abbotsholme was marked by a similar Romantic- era belief 
structure (Darling, 1981), and it was a book about Reddie and 
Abbotsholme that sparked Hahn to give up his studies to be an art 
historian and instead move into education (van Oord, 2010). 
However, Reddie, like much the rest of the Western English- 
speaking world at the time, drew from a view of self as something to 
be molded or instilled from the outside (Campbell, 1987; Freeman, 
2010; Michelson, 1999). This cultural organization of self, whom I 
am referring to as the instilled self, was philosophically challenged 
by the Enlightenment and Romantic periods (Michelson, 1999) and 
not necessarily in line with Hahn’s Germanic educational philoso-
phy, but the patriotic and religious institutional structuring of 
Western cultures maintained the instilled self as the dominant 
educational perspective into the mid- 20th century (Armstrong, 
1990; Campbell, 1987). Thus, it is possible to describe Hahn’s work 
as a bringing together of various educational traditions during a 
time where cultural norms regarding a pedagogy of self were 
likewise shifting toward something like— but not the same as— an 
inherent self, and this may have made Hahn’s work appear more 
progressive within the educational system than it was (see also 
Worsley, 1985).
Hahn’s work in this area was delayed by his service in World 
War I, but after the war ended, he quickly began a private school that 
tested his educational philosophy. Hahn’s first school venture was 
funded by Maximilian Alexander Friedrich Wilhelm, Prince of 
Baden, the last Imperial Chancellor of the German Empire, and for 
whom Hahn was the private secretary (Miner & Boldt, 2002;  
van Oord, 2010). This was the Schule Schloss Salem, founded in 1920 
in Salem, Germany; the school, fitting Hahn’s Platonic leanings and 
longstanding relationships with European aristocracy, was designed 
to attract the future generations of ruling elite (van Oord, 2010; 
Worsley, 1985). Among the school’s notable alumni were members 
of European royal families, children of military leaders, and the 
children of prominent scholars, authors, actors, and business 
executives, and although briefly closed during World War II, it 
reopened in 1945 and remains one of the most elite boarding schools 
in Europe (Schule Schloss Salem, n.d.).
After the then- Jewish Hahn (he converted to Christianity later 
in life) immigrated to Scotland from Nazi- controlled Germany in 
June of 1933— the stories of this process are both oft- repeated and 
sometimes contradictory in Hahnian lore (e.g., Miner & Boldt, 
2002; Worsley, 1985)— he used his considerable connections and 
tenuous acceptance into the British new progressive education 
movement (Darling, 1981; Worsley, 1985) to found his second 
school, Gordonstoun. This school likewise primarily catered to the 
European aristocracy; one of many notable pupils— Prince Charles, 
whose father had been a student of Hahn’s in both Germany and 
Scotland— referred to Hahn’s school climate as “Colditz in kilts” 
(Wilson, 2013), referencing the German WWII prisoner of war 
camp. Older boys in Hahn’s school were known to physically abuse 
young entrants, even by “taking a pair of pliers to their arms and 
twisting until the flesh tore open” (Wilson, 2013). Other educators 
at the time also noted a striking resemblance between Hahn’s 
tenure as headmaster and the youth development climate of the 
country he had left behind (Darling, 1981; Worsley, 1985). It was 
here at Gordonstoun, just as Schule Schloss Salem was being taken 
over by the German SS, that Outward Bound first started, and in 
the early days it was heavily influenced by Hahn’s educational 
philosophy (Freeman, 2010; Miner & Boldt, 2002), one in which 
democratic, emancipatory education was of little interest (Worsley, 
1985). In other words, this particular lineage of educational 
programming is one of aristocratic and repressive— if not 
oppressive— pedagogical practices, and its history is worth noting 
when venturing into contemporary practices, wherein a sort of 
hagiographic idealization of Hahn’s legacy has been more com-
monly accessible in the literature (e.g., Association for Experiential 
Education, n.d.; Minor & Boldt, 2002).
Shifting Cultural Claims to Self
By the 1960s, ongoing social and economic revolutions in Western 
culture, such as the civil rights movement and post- industrial 
capitalism, were openly challenging the prewar normalization of 
self- education as a nationalistic, if not militaristic endeavor, and 
ushered in a more complete transition to an already- occurring 
reorganization of self along individualistic terms (for an early 
recognition and description of this shift, see Dewey, 1916, 1929), 
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whom I will tentatively refer to as the individuated or isolated self 
(cf. Michelson, 1999). This change in selfhood, experiential 
learning, and youth development (referred to hereafter as ‘the 
shift’) has been documented elsewhere (e.g., Armstrong, 1990; 
Michelson, 1999; Millikan, 2006; Wills, 2005), and Outward 
Bound’s longstanding ties to Allgemeinbildung, wherein indi-
viduals were thought to manifest innate powers which must be 
tended, “and needed to be drawn out rather than put in” (Free-
man, 2010, p. 32), appeared to resonate during the English- 
speaking adoption of self- determination within post- industrial 
capitalism (Campbell, 1987).
By the 1960s, Outward Bound was caught up in the same 
trend much of the Western educational community was in: Theory 
and research had been largely unsuccessful at identifying ways to 
ascertain character as a stable concept simultaneously malleable 
enough to be substantially influenced by a single educational 
episode (Brookes, 2003; Freeman, 2010; Roberts, White, & Parker, 
1974). Also, the institution- to- individual pathway of influence was 
rapidly being replaced by a concept of self as uniquely and inter-
nally organized for the purposes of autonomously controlled 
growth and individually arrived- at meaning (cf. Dewey, 1922; 
Kaldec, 2007; Michelson, 1999). This was not a holistic replacing of 
instilled for isolated, hence my use of the term shift, but should be 
thought of as a prioritization of discourse. Outward Bound 
continued to refer to groups of students as patrols, hearkening back 
to its militaristic roots, but post- 1960 literature highlighted 
concepts like self- discovery above character training (Freeman, 
2010). A popular manifesto at the time defined the outcomes of 
American Outward Bound participation as the ability of a student 
to “[reorganize] the meaning or significance of his [sic] experience 
or existence and the ability to direct the course of subsequent 
experience” (Walsh & Golins, 1976, p. 13) while never mentioning 
Hahn. There has been a resurgence of interest in Hahn’s educa-
tional legacy over the last two decades in Outward Bound and 
larger experiential education scholarship (e.g., Brookes, 2003; 
James, 2000; Miner & Boldt, 2002), and the A- OB educational 
environment I entered for this study appeared influenced both by 
its historical legacy as well as by pseudo- contemporary discourses 
in EL scholarship (see also Quay and Seaman, 2013; Vernon, 2013).
The proceeding overview of Outward Bound was necessary, 
in my mind, for two reasons worth foregrounding (and others that 
will remain backgrounded). First, and most important, to continue 
with this paper it is worth destabilizing assumptions of a perma-
nent, individual self transcending the curriculum and pedagogy of 
this— or any— educational system. I will not be using this space to 
go into philosophical discussions of a permanent certainty of self 
from a subjective position (although a careful reader should be able 
to discern some arguments I may put forth on that topic), but I 
would point out that cultural- normative claims have and do shift, 
and educational systems do potentially serve as settings where 
students are taught to claim selves normalized within ideological 
contours (see also Tobin, 1995), and it is the cultural- educational 
self that is of interest here. Second, and related, Outward Bound 
appears to have historically idealized self as either hidden- yet- 
innate or autonomous- and- asocial, which logically situates 
pedagogy of self outside a sphere of academic interest and an 
unnecessary reflective concept for many educators, administrators, 
and researchers within the system. That is, the question of “what 
type of self do we teach students to have?” may be nonsensical from 
within the dominant conceptualizations, and, to me, this marks the 
topic as of critical importance.
Instead, the more contemporary of the two self- concepts 
espoused within individual- cognitivist models of learning and the 
curricular structures they have influenced (e.g., Kolb, 1984) has 
been favored by academia and is more supportive of pre- post, 
outcomes- based research (in which an idealized, normative self 
would be reified in objectifications). Indeed, fictionalizing a 
normative self as objective variables and measuring individual 
psychological markers, such as self- confidence or attitudes 
through self- reported Likert- type scales, became commonly relied 
upon among this educational community early on (Ewert, 1987), 
and self- system changes remain the preferred foci of research (e.g., 
Beightol, Jevertson, Carter, Gray, & Gass, 2011; Hattie, Marsh, Neill, 
& Richards, 1997).
Yet, simultaneously, Hahn’s Allgemeinbildung influence 
appears in a number of A- OB’s institutional artifacts, most notably 
a maximum often referenced and attributed as the motto of 
Gordonstoun: plus est en vous, which translates literally as “there is 
more in you.” That is, the other interpretation of changes to self 
resulting from participation, with durable appeal to educators, is 
that the innate self has been revealed and strengthened; as 
described by Outward Bound:
The shirker and the leader are equally revealed. Self- control has led to 
self- respect. Self- confidence has grown and life has been given a 
purpose and a sense of service encouraged. Such experiences must 
influence a boy’s attitude towards life and strengthen his character. 
(Outward Bound Trust, 1959, p. 15)
As a counter, this study reports instead on data exploring the 
organized teaching of self and other within the curriculum and 
pedagogy of the Diversity Program educational setting as not 
internal and subjective, but rather through references to imaginary, 
cultural- normative self and other (more on this soon), and how 
this shaped the potential for interaction amongst the community 
members.
Research Methods, Setting, and Researcher Roles
The Diversity Program is organized, at the root, around a 
normative- political claim that an egalitarian and inclusive social 
existence is preferred over contemporary forms of separation and 
hegemonic social structure, and further, that the educational 
system can and should play a role in social re- structuring toward a 
more just existence (A- OB, n.d.). Due to the foregrounded 
nonobjective and otherwise political learning intentions of the 
program and staff, a research practice that allows a researcher to 
directly grapple with such claims is necessary to satisfactorily 
understand and discuss the complexity of the educational system. 
Critical ethnography (Carspecken, 1996) provides a robust 
example of a nuanced approach to analyzing and articulating this 
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complexity; the data presented and discussed here is drawn from a 
larger study of the Diversity Program that employed this method.
I entered the ethnographic setting as an insider (see also 
Holyfield & Jonas, 2003), having spent a number of years as an 
educator in American OEE. In many ways this aided in my 
appropriation of the role of peripheral participant and ethno-
graphic observer (Carspecken, 1996). These educational settings 
often rely on uncomfortable or otherwise jarring environments to 
facilitate group cohesion and initiate holistic lifestyles of learning 
for intense, short- lived periods of time, and my preexisting ease 
with the transition from academic office to backpack and sleeping 
bag made it easier for me to navigate the research site and setting. 
That is, my understanding of the physical and psychological 
requirements necessary to develop a sense of maintenance and 
stability in wilderness settings allowed for added energies to be 
focused on data generation as well as grasping the nuances of the 
educational structure that may have otherwise been missed while 
managing the distractions of biting flies, rain, heat, etc.
The methodological details of this larger study are discussed 
in depth elsewhere (Vernon, in press), but it may be valuable to 
contextualize certain aspects. Data for this study were generated 
through observations coupled with jottings, field notes (Emerson, 
Fretz, & Shaw, 1996), photographs, and oftentimes audio record-
ings; informal as well as semistructured interviews with students, 
educators, and administrators, totaling 312 hours of direct 
observation and interviewing; and institutional artifacts includ-
ing lesson plans, curriculum manuals and guides, group journals, 
marketing materials, and course reports. The particulars of the 
educational structures (curriculum) and interactions (pedagogy) 
in relation to the idealizations of and teachings of self and other 
are the primary data drawn upon for this discussion. The 
vignettes that follow are reconstructions of educational interac-
tivities, in which audio- recorded dialogue (in italics) is inter-
sected with my jottings, field notes, and analytical explications 
fleshing out a full account, inviting readers to interact within and 
associate with or disassociate from.
Data analyses were mainly informed by communicative 
pragmatism and Carspecken’s (1996) explications of critical theory, 
including the utilization of meaning field and reconstructive 
horizon analyses, which are analytic practices meant to disrupt 
assumptive meaning- making and explicate the otherwise implicit, 
which occurs in much coding schema. That is, analyses were 
marked by dialectic and recursive interplay of emic and etic. 
Readers more familiar with constructivist or some generic forms of 
qualitative inquiry methodology, who may be anticipating terms 
like trustworthiness or saturation (see also O’Reilly & Parker, 2013), 
are encouraged to seek out Carspecken’s (1996) text for a more 
complete explanation of qualitative inquiry informed by critical 
theory than can be satisfactorily provided in this empirical article.  
I do wish to briefly highlight self as an analyzable concept.
Methodology of Self
Of the variety of analyses employed by critical researchers, 
Carspecken’s (1996) exploration of meaning field and reconstructive 
horizon analyses were particularly useful in discussing structural 
and interactive claims to or referent acts of self. Both analyses make 
explicit that which is implicit— yet intersubjectively grasped— in 
communicative acts. When communicating in understandable 
manners, there are a cohort of truth claims that the actor rests her 
validity on: objective, subjective, normative, and identity claims; 
likewise, for a communicative act to be grasped and understood, 
there must be a bracketed range of potential meanings conveyed 
(Carspecken, 1996). On the surface, it would appear an exploration 
of identity claims within the context of the educational setting 
setting best suits the discussion of self, but this was not the case, as I 
was engaging in an understanding of self as a cultural- normative 
activity, rather than as a subjective reveal. In some ethnographic 
research within EL settings, self and identity have been used 
interchangeably (e.g., Holyfield & Fine, 1997); I wish here to briefly 
draw a distinction between the two, with a more elaborate discus-
sion being retained for a following paper.
Identities, or the labeling of I and you with specific markers, and 
the meaningful interactions, roles, emotions, values, and so on that 
result from these labels (e.g., Carspecken, 1996; Mead, 1934), are what 
I might refer to as a meso- level construct in social sciences. Identity is 
acted out in manners partially accessible to and explicable by both 
actors and onlookers (although perhaps with some effort). That is, 
identity claims can be grasped primarily through individual actions 
and inactions yet are shaped in profoundly social and interactive 
manners and point toward a macro- level self type. Self, to contrast, 
has been sometimes understood as a culturally determined sense of 
wholeness (e.g., Markus & Kitayama, 1991) or of one’s own symbolic 
place and space in social existence as well as historically throughout a 
life course (Mead, 1934). In other words, self is a concept often 
relegated to either structural or subjective; more recent pragmatic 
theorizations have furthered the work of Mead by drawing the 
subjective into interactivity (e.g., Brandom, 1985), and I argue the 
work of Mead and Brandom may be extended to a prior, systemic 
self, best approached through normative claims when drawing from 
Dennis’s (publishing as Korth, 2007) discussion of empirical and 
imaginary:
The empirical will refer to claims that are dependent on space and 
time coordinates and are, in principle, accessible to multiple witnesses 
(Habermas, 1981). I will refer to these empirical claims as the discourse 
of the real. The imagined will refer to the paradigmatic structures, 
mental configurations, concepts, inferences, and so on that are not 
constructed through a one- to- one dependence on space and time 
coordinates, although the imaginary will make reference to space and 
time. In other words, the imaginary is not a mere reflection of that we 
presume to be real. It is something altogether different but related. 
(Korth, 2007, p. 70)
Self as a learnable or appropriable construct, if we follow this logic, 
may best be articulated as at first an intersubjectively idealized, 
imaginary concept that is referenced or drawn upon to generate 
self- like thoughts, behaviors, interactions, and so on as opposed to 
subjectivities constructed through interactions or as an agency- free 
cultural determinant. There may be less a ‘self ’ to define in a solely 
individualized sense as much as sociocultural, normative claims or 
democracy & education, vol 23, no- 2  Feature Article 6
idealizations regarding the imagined concept of self, and thus the 
use of self in coordinating and conditioning human interaction 
points not toward self as a knowable ‘thing’ for individuals but 
instead as an intersubjective idealization that is affirmed or 
troubled by individuals and groups. Thus, it is important in an 
educational setting where changes to self are intended learning 
outcomes (e.g., Hattie, Marsh, Neill, & Richards, 1997) to explore 
the normative claims organizing an intersubjective, culturally and 
historically structured imaginary ideal of self, and the conse-
quences of these claims as carried out in the real.
Self, then, may be placed prior to— yet is always back-
grounded in discussions of— identity as a boundary object 
(Wenger, 1999) between structure and lifeworld in social science, at 
least within a culture and history prioritizing self (Campbell, 1987). 
More specifically, self appears an intersubjective and sociocultur-
ally organized, ideological concept that then is drawn upon to 
coordinate not only a sense of one’s personhood but also other and 
normalized forms of social interaction. Discussions of self, within 
this approach, become necessary as a discourse of cultural and 
structural change toward locating and reorganizing self/other 
ideologies with the goal of democratic education and participation. 
This places the discussion of self as an idealized and advanced 
aspect of curriculum and pedagogy in a central position when 
addressing the topic of education for democracy, as was the case in 
this study. It is to this end that I focus the remainder of this paper, 
by providing vignettes and discussions of the manners in which we 
can see this occurring in one educational setting.
The Generalized Self and Being Other
Within both the curriculum and pedagogy of the course, self was 
imagined and referenced as whom I will label the owner/consumer. 
The co- instructors1 as well as the curriculum they drew from both 
implicitly and explicitly, although perhaps unintentionally, 
presented and anticipated interactions generated by this idealized 
construct. I present a series of vignettes that highlight how the 
owner/consumer self was referenced during the course.
How to Be Nice and Get What You Want
June 16, 2014; 9:57 a.m. The nine students and I sit in a pine grove, 
in an arc on our sleeping pads, which also double as cushions 
during lessons; Katherine stands in front of us, leaning over an 
imagined cooking station as if she is grilling hamburgers at a 
fast- food restaurant. Dillon walks up with his shoulders pulled 
forward, and is neshen in his order: Uh . . . lemmie get a veggie 
burger with some special sauce . . . and some Hi- C. Katherine 
responds mmhmm without looking up, and Dillon continues: and 
an order of sweet potato fries.
Katherine says OK and mutters quietly while pretending to 
put together Dillon’s order. She turns to face him; he has his hands 
in his pockets and appears to be mimicking passivity. She reaches 
out as if handing him a bag and says, OK, here’s your hamburger, 
and your Hi- C, and your potato fries. That will be ten dollars. Dillon 
looks toward Katherine’s outstretched hand and the imagined 
1 Pseudonyms are used to provide anonymity throughout the text.
paper bag with a disappointed appearance. This . . . uh . . . it’s uh . . . 
this? Group members laugh at his failed attempt to receive the 
correct food order; Katherine cheerfully retorts that yup, that looks 
good! Thank you and have a nice day! Dillon reaches out and ‘takes 
the bag’, turns, and walks away with a sad expression on his face.
This same act is carried out three more times; during the 
second act, Dillon again does not receive his intended order but 
reacts with frustration— kicking leaves and ‘storming off ’ from the 
scene, leaving Katherine to, while looking confused, exclaim that 
he had been a bad customer. During the third act, he postures 
aggressively and angrily toward Katherine, resulting in her 
‘spitting’ into his imagined hamburger before bringing it out for 
him. In the fourth act, Dillon speaks carefully, checks for under-
standing by having the order repeated back to him as well as 
double- checking on ingredients as they are brought out, and walks 
away with a pleased expression. Both Katherine and Dillon sit 
down, closing the arc into a circle, and Katherine brings a foldable 
dry- erase whiteboard out from a bag that she carries with her for 
lessons and props it up on her crossed legs.
This lesson, we’re going to call it . . . How to be nice and (empha-
sis hers) get what you want. Number one; someone describe Dillon’s 
approach in scene one. Katherine marks off a 1, 2, 3, and 4 on the 
whiteboard, and she and the students work through each, remem-
bering Dillon’s communicative acts and what identifying labels 
could be used to capture his demeanor. The four— passive, 
passive- aggressive, aggressive, and assertive— were presented, as 
Dillon explained to me later during an interview, as the most 
common interactions between people, and ideally what we want to be 
is assertive— because you’re saying what needs to be said, to who it 
needs to be said, in the correct manner. And you’re not inflaming the 
situation, but at the same time you’re getting what you want, OK?
With communicative assumptions drawn from the assertive-
ness training fad of the 1970s and early 1980s (e.g., Epstein, 1980; 
Hull & Schroeder, 1979), students were presented not only with a 
metaphor of the acting self as a consumer at a fast- food restaurant, 
but a lesson organizing communication styles into more or less 
effective tools for achieving the goals of a consuming self. The 
identity typology of passive, passive- aggressive, aggressive, or 
assertive offered examples of how the owner/consumer self can be 
organized with various desirable and undesirable consequences. 
For example, Dillon explained to the students that passivity is 
unhealthy because in situations where you’re not getting what you 
want, verbalizing or expressing what you want, um, it’s frustrating. 
You’re disempowered. And all of us as human beings, social beings, 
we all desire power— but there are appropriate ways to seek it out. Of 
the four typologies of the owner/consumer self that were presented, 
the first three were deconstructed by uncovering undesirable 
consequences stemming from each; the passive owner/consumer’s 
attempt was dismissed due to the inability to get what one wants 
when constructing behaviors aligned with this objectification; 
passive- aggressive suffered the same fate with the added undesir-
ability of negative acts toward others: passive- aggressive is similar to 
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passive, but demonstrating that aggression because you didn’t get 
what you want— that’s negative, because [passive] is more self- 
inflicted, and [passive- aggressive] is more inflicted on others, 
explained Dillon. That is, the situational identity of the owner/
consumer self is to blame for the inability to obtain what is wanted 
when organized as passive or passive- aggressive; however, to act 
out toward others due to one’s own failure to get what one wants, as 
the passive- aggressive owner/consumer does, is least desirable.
Dillon’s representation of the aggressive owner/consumer self 
was able to obtain his wants, but this was coupled with the undesir-
able extra of spit in the hamburger, hinting at the potential for 
repercussions if we do not organize an owner/consumer self that 
can successfully obtain our wants without conjuring animosity in 
the other. The assertive owner/consumer self was most desirable 
because, as explained by Dillon, when you’re assertive, you’re 
self- confident, first of all, and you’re aware of yourself, aware of what 
you want, and you’re also respecting other people. This assertive 
organization of the owner/consumer self simultaneously resulted in 
Dillon being able to get what he wanted from Katherine while also 
leaving her feeling as if she had not been harmed (cf. Woolfolk & 
Dever, 1979); thus, communicating with one another “assertively” 
became an educational theme for students while on course.
Where self is idealized as owner/consumer, it makes rational 
sense to objectify communication and interactions as goal- 
oriented; that is, to get what one wants becomes the primary 
normative goal for interaction, and this becomes the reference 
point for simultaneously constructing potential acts as well as 
assessing the value of those acts. Alberti and Emmons (1974) 
identify assertion as “behavior which enables a person to act in his 
[sic] own best interest” (p. 2). This is problematic when attempting 
democratic forms of participation, in which interdependence and 
the ability to be both empathetic and skeptical of self and other 
interests is paramount (cf. Leonardo & Porter, 2010). The assertive 
owner/consumer, by being valued for successfully obtaining the 
exact wants of acting self without intentionally harming other, who 
is, after all— despite being a means to an end— worth protecting 
from intentional symbolic or physical violence and oppression, was 
the ideal self to reference and practice during the course.
Owning Symbolic Positions
Along with approaching social interaction from the perspective of 
obtaining one’s own wants or advocating one’s own interests while 
viewing others as a means to a personal end, the owner/consumer 
self also claimed dominion over symbolic spaces and positions. 
Assertiveness training was one of four communication lessons 
whose progression was part of a larger curriculum on how to best 
address issues of social justice in students’ lives; during the final act 
of this lesson, students participated in a circle- talk (Seaman & 
Rheingold, 2013), wherein each student responded to a prompted 
question. Students were asked, How can you demonstrate assertive-
ness in your life, in one capacity or another?, opening up the 
possibility of addressing the topic of assertiveness and getting what 
one wants in a variety of manners. One of the most outspoken 
students in the course, Sarah, offered to respond to the prompt first:
Maybe, if you see somebody that’s getting picked on, or somebody’s just 
mistreating somebody else, instead of getting really angry or mad at 
them, and overdoing it [Researcher comment: because undesirable 
emotional responses are for passive- aggressive or aggressive owner/
consumers], you could approach it with a balanced set of emotions 
and talk to the person, maybe one- on- one, and say, “I don’t like how 
you did that, I’m not mad at you, but you need to consider how they 
feel and see if you would want to be treated that way.”
Sarah tactfully reorganized the discussion of identity typologies of 
the owner/consumer self into a discussion of potential conflict and 
injustice, but more important, because this circle- talk did not 
provide the space for interaction and dialogue, she organized the 
statement as an open- access, potential you, wherein the I is implied 
but others are welcome to pick up or try out the statement as also 
potentially theirs. This is sometimes referenced as a linguistic 
shifting (Wortham, 1996)— conscious or not— of various intentions 
and with various consequences; here, it supports symbolic dialogue 
where it is otherwise not physically possible. It may be argued that 
such a strategy obscures self by avoiding I- driven truth- claims due 
to discomfort with the topic, but I argue this is more appropriately 
recast as a response to a discomfort with the individuated structure 
of an interaction, wherein collaborative or collective discourse is 
being denied. The consequence of implying I and you as simulta-
neously partial occupants to a knowledge claim appears to lend 
credence to this being a subtle resistance to the owner/consumer 
self and normative assumption of individual spaces of reason 
(Brandom, 1985). Within this statement, potential positions are 
unowned and instead presented as symbolically public and 
multiple- access, and this makes reference to something like a 
contributing self, wherein shared access and collaboration are 
normative goals. She was quickly sanctioned.
Hmm. Really quick, could you summarize that, and could you 
put yourself into the context, by saying “I”? So, “I can demonstrate 
assertiveness by doing (blank)?” Dillon responded. Sarah looked 
confused, but then re- stated her previous comment: So, if I see 
somebody getting made fun of, then I can approach the person, and 
talk to them about it appropriately. Nice, said Dillon, almost 
inaudible in a whisper. Sarah had now claimed dominion over her 
symbolic act in such a manner as to tentatively commit to action 
toward a hypothetical, future other (Brandom, 1985) while simulta-
neously denying current, relevant others from interacting with her 
through sharing the dialogic space she had constructed earlier.
The next student responded while using the appropriate 
I- language, but the following student, María, struggled to negotiate 
the owner/consumer self into her response as well: I could be more 
assertive by addressing it so that you can get what you need— um, 
want— and you’ve gotta speak up . . . 
Whereas previously Dillon had corrected Sarah’s language 
toward owning her symbolic, potential positions, Katherine built 
on this idea for María and the rest of the students:
I’m going to back Dillon up on the “I” statements instead of the “you” 
statements. There’s this funny term that we have in our language, which 
is “you”: when “you” do this, when “you” do that; that is this great way 
democracy & education, vol 23, no- 2  Feature Article 8
of taking ownership off of ourselves— own it. [Dillon: Word.] Feel the 
power of saying “I can do this” instead of “I can, and then you can . . .” 
So I’m going to ask you, like Dillon, to rephrase that while using “I.”
María double- checked to see if she needed to start back over from 
the beginning of her response, and rephrased her statement while 
referencing self as no longer a contributor to a social process but now 
as owner of symbolic spaces and intentions: I can speak up for 
myself— if I don’t get what I actually needed; I can just say it nicely, and 
get what I want. . . . To congratulate her appropriation of self and 
ownership of her statement, both Dillon and Katherine clapped 
approvingly. Well said, responded Dillon, and Katherine further 
reinforced María’s speech act: That was beautiful, thank you.
Brandom (1985) described a space of reason as a symbolic, 
imaginary space wherein actors take stands on knowledge claims 
while simultaneously justifying the potential validity of those 
claims; actors lacking the ability to either justify or assent to the 
commitments of such a claim— such as an infant mimicking 
speech acts— are thought to be acting outside or on the periphery 
of the space of reason. I argue the imagined, idealized owner/
consumer self may be thought of in a similar, referential manner, 
and this space is both socially organized and policed. Further, 
peripheral to the privileged space in which self was organized was 
where alternative selves were referenced, such as Sarah’s and 
María’s non- owning speech acts; the co- instructors’ choice to reject 
their acts (and by extension, their situationally constructed 
identities and referenced selves) exemplified the systemic durabil-
ity of insulated, ideological commitments to a privileged— even if 
imaginary— space and inability to recognize or entitle (Brandom, 
1976) alternative spaces as also potentially valid or justifiable.
On Being Other: It’s Not the Place for Dissent
Discussions of self often assume self to be ubiquitous among 
individuals, save when distracted or otherwise unobservant of 
self- in- action (e.g., Mead, 1934). That is, it is assumed that we are all 
acting and interacting as selves— the self, symbolically and socially 
negotiated method and product it may be, is the option available to 
an individual. One is self, surrounded by real or imagined others; 
each other is in fact self to that specific person who in turn views 
the former as other. Thus, when discussing self, there is an implicit 
and backgrounded discourse of other of importance only because it 
refers to the I- self acting toward the you- other, and vice- versa with 
self and other reversed. I found this distinction unable to capture 
the nuances of self- other interactions in this educational program, 
primarily due to the assumption that I cannot purposefully 
organize as and appropriate other, and act as I- other in response to 
an acting you- self; decoupling self from I was necessary to fully 
grasp the complexity of the self/other pedagogical interactions.
What I mean by this is idealized conceptualizations of self are 
organized with relation to imagined, idealized others. Synchronous 
with the owner/consumer self is the submissive service- provider other. 
Katherine hinted at this imaginary ideal of other with her meta-
phoric representation as a fry- cook server to Dillon’s customer. The 
other backgrounded in the discussion of Dillon’s self was a service 
provider whose job it was to, if communicated with assertively, 
willingly and submissively provide the self with what it wants.
Are we practicing this [assertive, owner/consumer selves] all 
alone? asked Katherine as the communication lesson came to a 
close. No, replied the students and Dillon in unison. All right, said 
Katherine, what is it going to take to practice it with each other? Ivan 
said group effort, while Jeffrey said cooperation; Katherine had a 
different idea in mind: maybe a little bit of tough skin every so often. 
Hmm, nodded Dillon, as if in agreement.
So, Katherine offered, one thing you can do, if you notice anyone 
having passive- aggressive behavior, you might be able to help by 
saying, “Cool, Katherine, I’m noticing a little bit of passive- aggression, 
and I just want to help you turn that into assertiveness. Can you try 
that again?”And if someone asks, “Can I try that again?,” that means 
they are using good course language [she touches her thumb and index 
finger together in an ‘OK’ sign], and you can say, “Yeah! I’ve got a bit 
of tough skin, and I want to help you learn.”
The self is a potential space that can be claimed and acted from, but 
so also is the other; the submissive service- provider other should be 
willing— should even volunteer— to be subject to repetitions of 
potentially uncomfortable and/or oppressive interactions so that 
the self can practice toward the idealized assertive owner/ 
consumer. Taking on the role of self or other was situational and 
contingent on intersubjective cues, such as recognition of a 
potential owner/consumer acting from within a desirable or 
undesirable identity type.
While going through the circle- talk, self was a roving role 
during which the student enacting self was meant to address 
future, hypothetical others. The actual others in this space were, 
once denied the possibility to symbolically interact with the self ’s 
speech acts as these were communicatively ‘owned,’ left as passive 
observers waiting for their chance to act while drawing from the 
referent self. At alternate moments, such as when recognizing a 
potential self- in- action, students were encouraged to submit and 
volunteer to be other for the acting self. During specific educational 
settings, however, students were directly instructed to be other for 
an acting self.
June 18, 2014; 9:38 p.m. The students and instructors were 
sitting in a circle on a mixture of gravel and grass. Katherine was 
leading the students through their fourth and final communication 
lesson of the course: how to give (and receive) feedback.
Ach! shouted a blindfolded Denzel as he put a clove of raw 
garlic into his mouth, and the observing students laughed while 
two others— Ivan and Sarah, also blindfolded— nervously and 
curiously turned the garlic clove that Katherine had placed in their 
hands. After they had all eaten and described the garlic, she 
returned with a Skittle candy piece, much to the joy of the three 
students. Both the bitter (Sarah called it sharp) and the sweet now 
experienced, Katherine and the students decided that both are 
necessary in life— the former in small amounts to enhance and 
improve a dish, the latter a wonderful treat but not healthy in 
excess. I’m gonna give you a lesson on feedback, Katherine 
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continued. What do you think is the positive feedback and what do 
you think is the constructive?
The structure and consequences of feedback in EE systems 
have been topics that I have explored in greater depth elsewhere 
(Vernon, 2013); here I wish to only focus on the roles of feedback 
giver (self) and feedback receiver (other).
First of all, Katherine opined, my theory of feedback is that it’s really 
feed- forward. We’re not saying, “Hey, this is what happened this week, 
and you could have done this instead,” but “I noticed this, and you 
could be more effective in the future if . . . it’s a gift (emphasis hers), it’s 
a really cool gift; and give some Skittles, give some Skittles when you 
give the garlic— sometimes I think of a garlic sandwich, so like 
“Skittle- garlic- Skittle.”
The concept of feedback— or feed- forward— is organized here from 
the giver’s perspective; feedback is a communicative act performed 
by a self toward an other with the goal of initiating a desired 
behavior change. The articulation of gift sets up a metaphor for the 
potential other— the feedback receiver, who must be the willing 
submissive service- provider other to appropriately accept the gift. 
Again, Katherine explained:
So, with any gift, sometimes it’s a gift that you love, and you think, “Oh 
my gosh, I could do wonders with that!” But sometimes you get a gift 
and you’re like, “A tenth pair of socks, Grandma! Huh.” But you have 
to try them on, and wiggle your toes around in them. So you’re giving 
gifts to each other, and in the moment your job is to accept it. You can 
ask a clarifying question if you don’t understand it, like “can you try 
that again?,” but it’s not the place for dissent. And what we call that is: 
honest, open, and willing.
The metaphor of a gift from one’s grandmother sets up a 
cultural- normative reference to submissive acceptance out of 
duty or care; you- other is not meant to disrupt the more 
valuable action of me- self. Engaging in dissent or questioning 
would initiate the introduction of an also- self into the interac-
tion, hence the term ‘self- defense’, but by being other, there is 
actually no you- self to defend. Katherine then double- checked 
for understanding: and when you receive feedback, what do you 
think you can say?
Thank you? offered María as a potential response. Thank 
you! responded Katherine, in singsong agreement. Katherine 
explained other logistical rules for giving feedback, many of 
which were familiar to the students by this point, as they drew on 
the same idealizations of self: use I- statements, be specific, etc. 
After about six minutes to prepare to be a potential giver, the 
co- instructors and students went around the circle, giving 
feedback to the person seated on their left. I abstained from 
participating and so only observed the interactions; each self 
gave feedback to the other, while the other only— for every 
student and co- instructor who enacted the role— responded with 
thank you or a close variation (cool, thank you was Ivan’s 
response, for example) before switching from other to self and 
beginning the process anew.
In one of the first research studies I designed, I conducted 
in- depth interviews with co- instructors to understand the experi-
ence of co- teaching in these intense, all- encompassing environ-
ments (Vernon, 2011; Vernon & Seaman, 2012); I found reaching 
back to an interview from this work helped add context to the issue 
of self and other within the structure of a feedback encounter. As 
one of these earlier participants from that study had shared:
I think sometimes giving [feedback] helps facilitate getting my needs 
met . . . for lack of a better word, we usually give corrective feedback to 
people based on things that are somehow in conflict with our way of 
doing things, or in conflict with our understanding of the world or the 
way something should be done. If that’s the case, then we’re giving 
feedback almost in hopes that the person will take it and become more 
like us or more aligned with what we view as the way . . . it’s like we 
say it because we’re trying to help people do better, but help do better 
relative to what, you know? We give feedback so you can improve, but 
it’s like, improve on you meeting my vision of the world (laughs).
I believe this correctly identifies some of the conflict arising from 
the self/other relationship in which acting selves are encouraged to, 
as owner/consumer, anticipate other as submissive service- provider, 
and further, wherein the submissive service- provider other is 
claimed and performed by individuals in what is literally a self- 
affirming cycle. In systems where the appropriation of an idealized 
self and other is structurally mandated, this is even more problem-
atic, as an unreflexive and uncritical adherence to the imaginary, 
idealized forms of self and other render alternative, emancipatory 
and socially just representations of self and other as illogical, 
irrational, or otherwise inaccessible. Further, democratic participa-
tion relies on the assumption that individuals are capable of 
contributing to a social endeavor as an acting self (e.g., Dewey, 
1916), but the self/other pedagogy presented here relied on the 
assumption that educators can and should intentionally manipu-
late students’ referent acts of self and other, thus troubling a basic 
tenant in pragmatic theories of democracy.
Discussion
Of immediate impact for this particular setting and readers whose 
educational and scholarly practices resonate with this discussion is 
the recognition that ‘self- discovery’ is not that; self- learning was 
mediated by purposeful instruction on the part of the educators, 
who were drawing from an organizationally idealized curriculum 
of self. Students were directed and apprenticed (Rogoff, 1993) 
toward specific types of self and other, and this implicates com-
monly held beliefs within this educational community regarding 
how educational outcomes are achieved. Given the institutional 
advancements of discovery of and changes to self as anticipatable 
outcomes for participants (Freeman, 2010), it should not be 
surprising to see that A- OB curriculum takes an active role in 
setting the conditions within which students learn to perform 
approved versions of self and also learn how self is to interact with a 
society of others. In other words, a mathematics course ties 
expected learning outcomes directly to curriculum and pedagogy 
informed by mathematics education discourse; it should be no 
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surprise that an educational setting steeped in discourses of self 
takes an active role in deciding what self should be and how 
students should learn and demonstrate it.
Toward a Post- Mead Theory of Self
As an historical analysis, Michelson’s (1999) reasoning that the 
experiential learner is isolated to inner, cognitive processes (thus 
disrupting democratic, participatory learning) due to a paranoia 
of outside influence appears a valid interpretation, particularly 
given the psychological movement of self during the mid- 20th 
century (e.g., Maslow, 1943). As a contemporary analysis, 
however, the organization of self in this EE setting was not 
satisfactorily explained by purely extending Michelson’s line of 
scholarship. What appears more reasonable is that the experien-
tial learner (self) is built in relation with others— here the owner/
consumer and submissive service- provider. These are, I argue, 
examples of a reification of capitalist economic theory as relevant 
for organizing self and other, much as has already happened to 
relationships (social capital), cultural interplay (cultural capital), 
justifying the educational system (human capital theory), and 
many other non- monetary aspects of our social existence. 
Paranoia of outside influence appeared to be less of a motivation 
than paranoia of symbolic material loss or missed gain, meaning 
the progressive movement of experiential education has not 
outpaced the post- industrial economic influence it once sought 
to avoid (Dewey, 1916).
In this manner, we can also see that the self (and, we should 
now realize, the other) is not, contrary to Hahnian logic, necessar-
ily “discovered” or revealed through participation in adventure or 
other forms of experience (e.g., Simmel, 1965), but is taught, 
affirmed, and corrected with reference to ideological structures; yet 
it is also not necessarily instilled by an outside regime in which 
individuals are devoid of agency. Self is neither inherent nor 
instilled; we are instead able to consider self/other conceptualiza-
tions as sites of struggle for cultural normalization or reconstruc-
tion, in which institutions, communities, and individuals labor to 
make sense of social existence and the symbolic spaces for indi-
viduals, and wherein power relations regularly obstruct the 
democratic potential to collectively and critically examine 
conceptualizations as such.
Thus, the use of educational settings to practice embodying 
self and other, while used here to unintentionally advocate a 
pecuniary, capitalist self serviced by submissive others, thus 
reaffirming inequality and oppressive, goal- oriented social 
relations, may also be a setting for challenging social organization 
toward democratic participation. The symbolic spaces these 
idealizations occupy are policed and protected, but I argue are 
potentially penetrable, whether through symbolic violence 
(Leonardo & Porter, 2010), confusion through variation and play 
(Michelson, 1999; Vernon, in press), or collective critical inquiry 
(Kaldec, 2007). In other words, the structure of self- other idealiza-
tions functioned to actively mediate the conditions in which 
individuals were taught to anticipate, recognize, and contribute to 
the community, making this aspect of the educational setting 
inseparable from, and thus a necessary addition to, any discussion 
of experiential learning and its connection with democracy or 
forms of self- education.
To aid in this discourse and practice, I offer up the method-
ological and theoretical discussion of self and other as cultural- 
normative, idealized types in which we no longer necessarily 
assume self as inseparable from I, but rather locate self and other as 
situationally and intersubjectively organized places and spaces of 
interpretable and anticipatable relation, both potentially refer-
enced and acted on by I or you. In other words, I argue self and 
other are claimable, interdependent interactions with anticipatable 
enactments (cf. Brandom, 1976). To the extent self has been 
ubiquitously cast with I points toward its maintenance as a 
privileged position over other, and explains how both are learned 
and self is consistently claimed. That it thus becomes the struggle 
to recognize you as also- self, with undergirds much in democratic 
movements (e.g., Leonardo & Porter, 2010), further locates self in a 
privileged position. These intersubjective idealizations are perhaps 
backgrounded in many forms of communicative interaction, and 
must be attended to in such a manner as to not establish multiple 
selves in dialogue but rather to equalize the space between self and 
other in order to negate the necessity for either, simultaneously 
affording equal opportunity in both.
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